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Financial Bubbles, Real Estate bubbles,
Derivative Bubbles, and the Financial and
Economic Crisis
Didier Sornette and Ryan Woodard
Abstract The financial crisis of 2008, which started with an initially well-defined
epicenter focused on mortgage backed securities (MBS), has been cascading into a
global economic recession, whose increasing severity and uncertain duration has led
and is continuing to lead to massive losses and damage for billions of people. Heavy
central bank interventions and government spending programs have been launched
worldwide and especially in the USA and Europe, with the hope to unfreeze credit
and boltster consumption. Here, we present evidence and articulate a general frame-
work that allows one to diagnose the fundamental cause of the unfolding financial
and economic crisis: the accumulation of several bubbles and their interplay and mu-
tual reinforcement has led to an illusion of a “perpetual money machine” allowing
financial institutions to extract wealth from an unsustainable artificial process. Tak-
ing stock of this diagnostic, we conclude that many of the interventions to address
the so-called liquidity crisis and to encourage more consumption are ill-advised
and even dangerous, given that precautionary reserves were not accumulated in the
“good times” but that huge liabilities were. The most “interesting” present times
constitute unique opportunities but also great challenges, for which we offer a few
recommendations.
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1 Diagnostics, proximate and systemic origins of the financial
crisis
At the time of writing (first half of April 2009), the World is suffering from a major
financial crisis that has transformed into the worst economic recession since the
Great Depression, perhaps on its way to surpass it. The purpose of the present paper
is to relate these developments to the piling up of five major bubbles:
1. the “new economy” ICT bubble starting in the mid-1990s and ending with the
crash of 2000,
2. the real-estate bubble launched in large part by easy access to a large amount
of liquidity as a result of the active monetary policy of the US Federal Reserve
lowering the Fed rate from 6.5% in 2000 to 1% in 2003 and 2004 in a successful
attempt to alleviate the consequence of the 2000 crash,
3. the innovations in financial engineering with the CDOs (collateralized Debt Obli-
gations) and other derivatives of debts and loan instruments issued by banks and
eagerly bought by the market, accompanying and fueling the real-estate bubble,
4. the commodity bubble(s) on food, metals and energy, and
5. the stock market bubble peaking in October 2007.
Since mid-2007, the media have been replete with news of large losses by major in-
stitutions and by operational and regulatory mishaps. One big question is: how deep
will be the losses? Another one is: how severe could be the ensuing recession(s)?
These questions are stupendous because financial markets have transformed over
the past decades from thermometers and liquidity providers of the real economy
(tail moving with the dog) into “the tail wagging the dog,” that is, financial markets
now seem to drive the economy. To mention just one example, there are numerous
indications that the corporate strategy of a given firm is significantly influenced by
the value of its stock quoted in the capital markets. This is due to many different
factors, including incentives (stock options held by CEOs and other top managers),
and the financing channels for firm growth offered by higher market valuation, such
as during mergers & acquisition operations (Broekstra et al., 2005).
Our starting point is that financial markets play an essential role in fostering the
growth of economies in developed as well as in emergent countries. This impact of
financial markets has been growing so much that it is not any longer an exaggeration
to suggest that the economy has become in part controlled by a kind of “beauty
contest,” to paraphrase John Maynard Keynes, where one of the rules of the game
for a firm is to appear “beautiful” to the financial analysts’ eyes and to the investors,
by meeting or even beating analysts’ earning expectations. In this context, bubbles
and crashes exemplify the resulting anomalies.
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1.1 Nature of the financial and economic crisis
Better than one thousand words, figure 1 compares the estimated losses for three
asset classes [5]:
• losses of U.S. subprime loans and securities, estimated as of October 2007, at
about $250 billion dollars;
• expected cumulative loss in World output associated with the crisis, based on
forecasts as of November 2008, estimated at $4,700 billion dollars, that is, about
20 times the initial subprime loss;
• decrease in the value of stock markets, measured as the sum, over all markets, of
the decrease in stock market capitalization from July 2007 to November 2008,
estimated at about $26,400 billion, that is, 100 times the initial subprime loss!
While emphasizing dramatically the cascade from a relatively limited and local-
ized event (the subprime loan crisis in the United States) to the World economy
and the World stock markets, this starting point is deceptive in many ways, as will
become clear below. The main misconception from our viewpoint is reducing the
discussion to just the last few years. The present essay builds an argument that the
present turmoil has its roots going back about 15 years in the past.
Fig. 1 Initial subprime losses (almost invisible in the figure) and subsequent declines up to Novem-
ber 2008 in World GDP and World stock market capitalization (in Trillions US Dollars). Source:
IMF Global Financial Stability Report; World Economic Outlook November update and estimates;
World Federation of Exchanges. Reproduced from Blanchard (2008)
Figures 2 and 3 provide additional insights on the extraordinary character of the
developments of the present crisis. First, figure 2 shows the total amount of non-
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borrowed reserves of depository institutions (savings banks which are regulated by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)) from the late 1950s to April
2009. Notice the almost vertical drop from a level of slightly above +40 billion
dollars to almost (minus!) −350 billion dollars that occurred in the last quarter of
2008, followed by a dramatic rebound to +300 billion dollars. In the last quarter
of 2008, under-capitalized banks continued to hemorrhage money via losses and
write-downs of over-valued assets. These banks had to borrow money from the Fed-
eral Reserve to maintain their reserves and their viability. What is striking in graph
2 is the exceptional amplitudes of the drop and rebound, which represent variations
completely beyond anything that could have been foreseen on the basis of the pre-
vious 60 years of statistical data. Elsewhere, we refer to events such as those shown
in figures 2 and 3, which blow up the previous statistics, as “outliers” [33, 36] or
“kings” [44].
Fig. 2 Non-borrowed reserves of depository institutions from the late 1950s to April 2009. The
vertical scale is expressed in billions of dollars. Source: Board of governors of the Federal Reserve
system (2008 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, research.stlouisfed.org)
Figure 3 shows the time evolution of the M1 multiplier, defined as the ratio of M1
to the Adjusted Monetary Base estimated by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Recall that M1 is defined as the total amount of money1 in a given country (here
the data is for the U.S.A.). The graph 3 again exhibits an extraordinary behavior,
with an almost vertical fall to a level below 1! This reveals clearly the complete
1 currency in circulation + checkable deposits (checking deposits, officially called demand de-
posits, and other deposits that work like checking deposits) + traveler’s checks, that is, all assets
that strictly conform to the definition of money and can be used to pay for a good or service or to
repay debt.
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freezing of lending by financial institutions. Normally, the M1 multiplier is larger
than 1 since money put on a checking account is used at least in part by banks
to provide loans. The M1 money multiplier has recently slipped below 1. So each
$1 increase in reserves (monetary base) results in the money supply increasing by
$0.95. This expresses the fact that banks have substantially increased their holding
of excess reserves while the M1 money supply has not changed by much. This
recent development in the M1 multiplier is another illustration of the extraordinary
occurrence that is presently unfolding.
Fig. 3 Money multiplier M1 defined as the ratio of M1 to the St. Louis Adjusted Monetary
Base (http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/mt/) from 1983 to March
2009. Source: Board of governors of the Federal Reserve system (Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, research.stlouisfed.org)
This concept of “outliers” or “kings” is important in so far as it stresses the ap-
pearance of transient amplification mechanisms. As we will argue below, the occur-
rence of the crisis and its magnitude was predictable and was actually predicted by
some serious independent economists and scholars. They were not taken seriously
at a time when everything seems rosy, leading to what we refer to as an illusion
of the “perpetual money machine.” Of course, we am not claiming deterministic
predictability for the specific unfolding scenario of the crisis, only that it was clear
that the last 15 years of excesses have led to an unsustainable regime that could
only blow up. In a series of papers to be reviewed below, our group has repeat-
edly warned about the succession of bubbles and their unsustainable trajectories
[34, 65, 71, 72, 73, 64].
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1.2 Standard explanations for the financial crisis
Before we construct our arguments and present the evidence, let us review briefly
the standard proximal explanations that have been proposed in the literature. They
all share a part of the truth and combine to explain in part the severity of the crisis.
But, the full extent of the problem can only be understood from the perspective
offered in sections 2 and 3.
1.2.1 Falling real estate values
It has been argued that the immediate cause for the financial crisis is the bursting
of the house price bubble principally in the USA and the UK and a few other coun-
tries, leading to an acceleration of defaults on loans, translated immediately into a
depreciation of the value of mortgage-backed security (MBS) [18]. After a peak in
mid-2006 (see subsection 3.3), the real-estate market in many states plateaued and
then started to decrease. A number of studies have shown indeed a strong link be-
tween house price depreciation and defaults on residential mortgages (see Ref. [16]
and references therein). In particular, Demyanyk and van Hemert (2008) [17] ex-
plain that all along since 2001 subprime mortgages have been very risky, but their
true riskiness was hidden by rapid house price appreciation, allowing mortgage ter-
mination by refinancing/prepayment to take place. Only when prepayment became
very costly (with zero or negative equity in the house increasing the closing costs of
a refinancing), did defaults took place and the unusually high default rates of 2006
and 2007 vintage loans occurred.
The explanation of the crisis based on falling real estate prices is both right and
wrong: right mechanically as understood from the previous paragraph; wrong be-
cause it takes as exogenous the fall in house prices, which would suggest that it
comes as a surprise. In contrast, section 3 will argue that the fall in real estate value
occurred as part of a larger scheme of events, all linked together.
1.2.2 Real-estate loans and MBS as a growing asset class held by financial
institutions
A mortgage-backed security (MBS) is a pool of home mortgages that creates a
stream of payments over time paid to its owner. The payments are taken from those
produced by borrowers who have to service the interests on their debts. Figure 4
summarizes the network of agents interacting to give life to the MBS.
Developing along with the real-estate bubble, the explosive exponential growth
of the nominal market value of all MBS issued from 2002 to 2007, together with its
subsequent collapse, justifies refering to it as a “bubble.” According to the Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association, aggregate global CDO (collateralized
Debt Obligations) issuance grew from USD $150 billion in 2004, to close to USD
$500 billion in 2006, and to $2 trillion by the end of 2007. From 0.6 trillion dollars,
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the cumulative notional value of CDOs grew to 26 trillion dollars at the end of 2006.
This bubble was fueled firstly by the thirst for larger returns for investors in the USA
and in the rest of the World. It was made possible by a wave of financial innova-
tions leading to the illusion that the default risks held by lenders, principally banks,
could be diversified away. These innovations in financial engineering include the
CDOs and other derivatives of debts and loan instruments eagerly bought by insur-
ance companies, mutual fund companies, unit trusts, investment trusts, commercial
banks, investment banks, pension fund managers, private banking organizations and
so on. Since 2007, large losses by major institutions and often related operational
and regulatory mishaps have been reported.
The sheer size of the nominal value of MBS held in the books of banks, insur-
ance companies and many other institutions explains in part the amplitude of the
crisis: when the deflation of the real-estate bubble started, the rate of defaults sky-
rocketed and the holders of MBS started to suffer heavy losses. As a consequence,
many financial institutions have found themselves with insufficient equity and cap-
ital, leading to bankruptcies, fire sale acquisitions or bailouts by governments.
Fig. 4 Securitization, a form of structured finance, involves the pooling of financial assets, es-
pecially those for which there is no ready secondary market, such as mortgages, credit card re-
ceivables, student loans. The pooled assets are transfered to a special purpose entity and serve
as collateral for new financial assets issued by the entity. The diagram shows the many involved
parties.
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While compelling, this explanation is incomplete because it does not address
the question of why did the MBS bubble develop. The underlying mechanisms for
bubble formation are addressed in section 2. This will help us understand the kind
of inevitability associated with the current crisis.
1.2.3 Managers’ greed and poor Corporate governance problem
It is clear to all observers that banks have acted incompetently in the recent MBS
bubble by accepting package risks, by violating their fiduciary duties to the stock-
holders, and by letting the compensation/incentive schemes run out of control.
From executives to salesmen and trading floor operators, incentive mechanisms
have promoted a generalized climate of moral hazard. Justified by the principles of
good corporate governance, executive compensation packages have a perverse dark
side of encouraging decision makers to favor strategies that lead to short-term ir-
reversible profits for them at the expense of medium and long-term risks for their
firm and their shareholders. Even if the number of CEOs facing forced turnover
has increased 3 to 4-fold during the past 20 years while, simultaneously, most con-
tractual severance agreements require the forfeiture of unvested options, lump-sum
payments and waiving forfeiture rules often compensate for such losses. There is
something amiss when the CEOs of Citibank and of Countrywide walk out of the
mess they created for their firms with 9 figure compensation packages. It is often the
case that firms finally turn out losing significantly more when the risks unravel than
their previous cumulative gains based on these risky positions, while the decision
makers responsible for this situation keep their fat bonuses. As long as the risks are
borne by the firm and not equally by the decision makers, the ensuing moral hazard
will not disappear. It is rational for selfish utility maximizers and it will therefore
remain a major root of future financial crises.
Herding effects amplify the moral hazard factor just discussed. Indeed, perfor-
mance is commonly assessed on the basis of comparisons with the average industry
performance. Therefore, each manager cannot afford to neglect any high yield in-
vestment opportunity that other competitors seem to embrace, even if she believes
that, on the long run, it could turn out badly. In addition, herding is often ratio-
nalized by the introduction of new concepts, e.g. “the new economy” and new “real
option” valuation during the Internet bubble. And, herding provides a sense of safety
in the numbers: how could everybody be so wrong? Evolutionary psychology and
neuro-economics inform us that herding is one of the unavoidable consequences of
our strongest cognitive ability, that is, imitation. In a particularly interesting study
using functional magnetic resonance imaging on consumption decisions performed
by teenagers, Berns et al. (2009) have recently shown that the anxiety generated by
the mismatch between ones own preferences and others motivates people to switch
their choices in the direction of the consensus, suggesting that this is a major force
behind conformity.
Greed, anxiety, moral hazard and psychological traits favoring risk taking in fi-
nance were prevalent in the past and are bound to remain with us for the foreseeable
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future. Therefore, the question whether greed and poor governance was at the origin
of the crisis should be transformed into the question of timing, that is, why these
traits were let loose to foster the development of anomalous excesses in the last few
years.
1.2.4 Poor lending standards and deteriorating regulations and supervision
Philippon and Reshef provide an informative view on the question posed by the
title of this section, based on detailed information about wages, education and oc-
cupations to shed light on the evolution of the U.S. financial sector from 1906 to
2006 [51]. They find that financial jobs were relatively skill-intensive, complex, and
highly paid until the 1930s and after the 1980s, but not in the interim period. They
find that the determinants of this evolution are that financial deregulation and cor-
porate activities linked to IPOs and credit risk increase the demand for skills in fi-
nancial jobs, while computers and information technology play a more limited role.
Philippon and Reshef’s analysis shows that wages in finance were excessively high
around 1930 and from the mid 1990s until 2006 [51]. It is particularly interesting
to note that these two periods have been characterized by considerable excesses in
the form of many bubbles and crashes. The last period is particularly relevant to our
arguments presented in section 3 over which a succession of 5 bubbles developed.
Evidence of deteriorating regulations abounds. Keys et al. (2008) [40] found that
(observed) lending standards in the subprime mortgage market did deteriorate; and
the main driving force of the deterioration was the securitization of those loans.
Poser (2009) provides important clues on the failures of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission. Its most visible fault was its inability or reluctance to detect
the alleged Madoff Ponzi scheme. But Poster [52] points out that the decline in
SEC’s regulatory and enforcement effectiveness began three decades ago. While in
part explained by insufficient resources and inadequate staff training, the main cause
of the SEC decline can probably be attributed to the growing prevalence of the ethos
of deregulation that pervaded the U.S. government [52].
This ethos is well exemplified by the failure to pass any legislation on finan-
cial derivatives. Going back to the 1990s, Alan Greenspan, supported successively
by then Treasury Secretaries Robert Rubin and Laurence Summers, convinced the
U.S. Congress to make the fateful decision not to pass any legislation that would
have supervised the development and use of financial derivatives, notwithstanding
various attempts by legislators and the call from expert financiers of the caliber of
Warren Buffet and Georges Soros who warned years before the present crisis about
these “weapons of financial mass destruction”. After being one of the most vocal
supporters of the self-regulation efficiency of financial markets, Alan Greenspan is
now writing in his memoirs that the villains were the bankers whose self-interest he
had once bet upon for self-regulation.
The story would remain incomplete without distinguishing between the banking
system which is highly regulated and the parallel or shadow banking system which
is much less so [42]. In a speech in June 2008, T.F. Geithner (U.S. Treasury sec-
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retary since January 26, 2009) said: “The structure of the financial system changed
fundamentally during the boom, with dramatic growth in the share of assets out-
side the traditional banking system. This non-bank financial system grew to be very
large, particularly in money and funding markets. In early 2007, asset-backed com-
mercial paper conduits, in structured investment vehicles, in auction-rate preferred
securities, tender option bonds and variable rate demand notes, had a combined as-
set size of roughly $2.2 trillion. Assets financed overnight in triparty repo grew to
$2.5 trillion. Assets held in hedge funds grew to roughly $1.8 trillion. The combined
balance sheets of the then five major investment banks totaled $4 trillion.”
Given the coexisting two banking systems, the regular system being explicitly
guaranteed with strict capital requirements and the shadow system being implicitly
guaranteed with looser capital requirements, wealth utility maximizing bankers and
investors have been naturally attracted to the second, which provided new ways to
get higher yield [42]. Here, the implicit guarantee is that Bear Stearns, AIG and Mer-
rill Lynch, while not protected by the FDIC, were protected –as the facts showed–
by the belief that some firms are too big to fail.
1.2.5 Did the Fed Cause the Housing Bubble?
As a logical corollary of the previous subsection, several notable economists have
blamed the Federal Reserve and the U.S. government for failing to recognize that the
shadow banking system, because it was serving the same role as banks, should have
been regulated [42]. Stanford economist J.B. Taylor goes further by pointing out
the errors that the Federal Reserve made in creating and fueling the crisis [67, 68],
starting with the incredible monetary expansion of 2002-2003 (described more in
section 3.2), followed by the excesses of the expansion of government-sponsored
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac who were encouraged to buy MBS. These errors con-
tinued with the misguided diagnostic that the crisis was a liquidity problem rather
than one fundamentally due to counter-party risks.
Actually, A. Greenspan, the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve stated on
October 23, 2008 in a testimony to the U.S. Congress, in reply to questions by
Congressman H.A. Waxman: “I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interests
of organizations, specifically banks and others, were such as that they were best
capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms.” Referring
to his free-market ideology, Mr. Greenspan added: “I have found a flaw. I dont know
how significant or permanent it is. But I have been very distressed by that fact.” Mr.
Waxman pressed the former Fed chair to clarify his words. “In other words, you
found that your view of the world, your ideology, was not right, it was not working,”
Mr. Waxman said. “Absolutely, precisely,” Mr. Greenspan replied. “You know, that’s
precisely the reason I was shocked, because I have been going for 40 years or more
with very considerable evidence that it was working exceptionally well.” Greenspan
also said he was “partially” wrong in the case of credit default swaps, complex
trading instruments meant to act as insurance against default for bond buyers, by
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believing that the market could handle regulation of derivatives without government
intervention.
However, in an article in the Wall Street Journal of March 11, 2009, A. Greenspan
responded to J.B. Taylor by defending his policy on two arguments: (1) the Fed
controls overnight interest rates, but not “long-term interest rates and the home-
mortgage rates driven by them”; and (2) a global excess of savings was “the pre-
sumptive cause of the world-wide decline in long-term rates.” Neither argument
remains solid under scrutiny. First, the post-2002 period was characterized by one-
year adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), teaser rates that reset in, say, two or three
years. Five-year ARMs became “long-term” money. The overnight federal-funds
rate that the Fed controls substantially influences the rates on such mortgages. Sec-
ond, Greenspan offers conjecture, not evidence, for his claim of a global savings
excess. Taylor has cited evidence from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to
the contrary, however. Global savings and investment as a share of world GDP have
been declining since the 1970s, as shown by the data in Taylor’s book [68].
1.2.6 Bad quantitative risk models in banks (Basel II)
Since mid-2007, an increasing number of economists, policy-makers and market
operators have blamed the Basel II framework for banks’ capital adequacy to be a
major cause for the subprime financial crisis.
Basel II is the second of the Basel Accords, which provide recommendations on
banking laws and regulations issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion. Basel II was initially published in June 2004, with the purpose of creating an
international standard that banking regulators can use when creating regulations on
how much capital banks need to put aside to guard against the types of financial
and operational risks banks face. The specific goals of Basel II are to ensure that
capital allocation is more risk sensitive, to separate operational risk from credit risk,
to quantify both types of risks, and to synchronize economic and regulatory capital.
First, one should point out that the implementation of Basel II was delayed by
different revisions announced on September 30, 2005 by the four US Federal bank-
ing agencies (the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the
Office of Thrift Supervision) [3]. Second, describing the actual role played by the
new prudential regulation in the crisis and discussing the main arguments raised
in the current debate, Cannata and Quagliariello (2009) [12] discriminate between
more constructive criticisms and weaker accusations and conclude that there are no
sound reasons for abandoning the philosophy underlying the Basel II framework.
The dotcom and housing bubbles as well as the development of an inflated finan-
cial sphere were actually apparent to many people. While imperfect, the so-called
failure of models has played a relatively limited role in the unraveling of the cri-
sis. More important is the desire of economists to think “things are different this
time.” This is reminiscent of the “new economy” mantra of the 1920s preceding
the crash of Oct. 1929, the “new economy” claim of 1962 during the tronic boom
12 Didier Sornette and Ryan Woodard
preceding a severe downturn of the stock market and the “new economy” sentiment
of the 1990’s during the ITC bubble. Things change, but some things remain the
same, such as greed and the belief that something fundamentally new is happening
that calls for a downward revision of risk assessment. Herding is further amplified
by the political difficulties in acknowledging independently what data tells us. B.
DeLong, P. Krugman and N. Roubini are among those prominent vocal economists
who have been worried about the development of the economy and the unsustain-
able succession of bubbles over the last decade, but they did not have the influence
to make a significant impact on the US Congress or on Main Street (not to speak of
Wall Street). Unfortunately, few see any pressing need to ask hard questions about
the sources of profits when things are doing well. And even fewer will accept the
“pessimistic” evidence that the “dancing” is going to stop, when all (superficial) evi-
dence points to the contrary. Furthermore, one little discussed reason for the present
crisis was the lack of adequate education of top managers on risks in all its dimen-
sions and implications. How does one expect a CEO without risk culture to act on
the face of the contradictory evidence of, on the one hand, a negative recommenda-
tion of the director of its risk management department and, on the other hand, great
short-term potential gains in a global exuberant market? These factors, more than
the “bad” models, were probably the problem with the use of quantitative models.
1.2.7 Rating agency failures
Credit rating agencies have been implicated as principal contributors to the credit
crunch and financial crisis. They were supposed to create transparency by rating
accurately the riskiness of the financial products generated by banks and financial
actors. Their rating should have provided the basis for sound risk-management by
mortgage lenders and by creators of structured financial products. The problem is
that the so-called AAA tranches of MBS have themselves exhibited a rate of default
many times higher than expected and their traded prices are now just a fraction of
their face values.
To provide the rating of a given CDO or MBS, the principal rating agencies –
Moodys, Fitch and Standard & Poors – used quantitative statistical models based
on Monte Carlo simulations to predict the likely probability of default for the mort-
gages underlying the derivatives. One problem is that the default probabilities fed
into the calculations were in part based on historical default rates derived from the
years 1990-2000, a period when mortgage default rates were low and home prices
were rising. In doing so, the models could not factor in correctly the possibility of
a general housing bust in which many mortgages are more likely to go into default.
The models completely missed the possibility of a global meltdown of the real es-
tate markets and the subsequent strong correlation of defaults. The complexity of
the packaging of the new financial instruments added to the problem, since rating
agencies had no historical return data for these instruments on which to base their
risk assessments. In addition, rating agencies may have felt compelled to deliber-
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ately inflate their ratings, either to maximise their consulting fees or because the
issuer could be shopping for the highest rating.
Recently, Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) [69] showed that all these issues were
amplified by one single factor, the complexity of the new CDO and MBS. The sheer
complexity makes very difficult the calibration of the risks from past data and from
imperfect models that had not yet stood the test of time. In addition, the greater
the complexity, the larger the variability in risk estimations and, thus, of ratings ob-
tained from different models based on slightly different assumptions. In other words,
greater complexity introduces a large sensitivity to model errors, analogous to the
greater sensitivity to initial conditions in chaotic systems. If the announced rating
is the maximum of all realised ratings, it will be a biased signal of the asset’s true
quality. The more ratings differ, the stronger are issuers’ incentives to selectively
disclose (shop for) ratings. Skreta and Veldkamp think that the incentives for biased
reporting of the true risks have been latent for a long time and only emerged when
assets were sufficiently complex that regulation was no longer detailed enough to
keep them in check. Note that the abilities of ratings manipulation and shopping to
affect asset prices only exist when the buyers of assets are unaware of the games
being played by the issuer and rating agency. This was probably true until 2007,
when the crisis exploded.
While these elements are important to understand the financial crisis, they treat
the occurrence of the triggering real estate meltdown as exogenous. In addition, the
extension of the leveraging on the new MBS and CDO derivatives is not explained.
Overall, we need much more to fully grasp the full underpinning factors of the
financial crisis.
1.2.8 Under-estimating aggregate risks
As explained above, the wave of financial innovations has led to the illusion that
the default risks held by lenders, principally banks, could be diversified away. This
expectation reflects a widely spread misconception that forgets about the effects of
stronger inter-dependencies associated with tighter firm networks.
Recent multidisciplinary research on self-organizing networks [59, 55, 29, 6] has
shown unambiguously that loss of variety, lack of redundancy, removal of compart-
ments, and stronger ties are all recipes for disaster. This is all the more so because
the medium-sized risks are decreased, giving a false impression of safety based on
the illusion that diversification works. And there is the emergence of an extremely
dangerous collective belief that risks have disappeared. This led to the so-called
“great moderation” in the fluctuations of GDP growths of developed economies and
to absurd low risk pricing in financial markets in the last decade.
Due to globalization and the intricate networks of bank interdependencies (thou-
sands of banks borrow and lend to each other every day in a complex ballet) [23, 7],
the explosively growing losses on their MBS books and the realization that other
banks were in the same situation have led to a flight for safety. As a consequence,
banks have basically stopped inter-bank lending for fear of defaults of their finan-
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cial counterparties. Correlatively, banks have made more rigid their previously lax
lending practices into ridiculously stringent procedures offered to firms and pri-
vate customers, basically threatening to freeze the real economy, which is becoming
strangled by cash flow problems.
1.3 The illusion of the “perpetual money machine”
The different elements described above are only pieces of a greater process that
can be aptly summarized as the illusion of the “perpetual money machine.” This
term refers to the fantasy developed over the last 15 years that financial innovations
and the concept that “this time, it is different” could provide an accelerated wealth
increase. In the same way that the perpetual motion machine is an impossible dream
violating the fundamental laws of physics, it is impossible for an economy which
expands at a real growth rate of 2-3 per cent per year to provide a universal profit
of 10-15 per cent per year, as many investors have dreamed of (and obtained on
mostly unrealized market gains in the last decade). The overall wealth growth rate
has to equate to the growth rate of the economy. Of course, some sectors can exhibit
transient accelerated growth due to innovations and discoveries. But it is a simple
mathematical identity that global wealth appreciation has to equal GDP growth.
Fig. 5 Household Net Worth as a percent of GDP from 1952 to March
2009. This includes real estate and financial assets (stocks, bonds, pension re-
serves, deposits, etc) net of liabilities (mostly mortgages). The data is from
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/z1r-5.pdf (11
Dec. 2008). Adapted from http://www.calculatedriskblog.com
However, in the last decade and a half, this identity has been violated by an
extraordinary expansion of the financial sphere. Consider first the evidence given
in figure 5, which shows the total household net worth in the U.S. expressed as a
fraction of GDP from 1952 to March 2009. This ratio was relatively stable between
300% and 350% for more than 40 years. Since 1995, two major peaks towering
above 450% can be observed to be followed by their collapse. The last rightmost
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arrow points to the peak attained in the third quarter of 2007, which is followed by
a drastic drop. The figure suggests that the drop may have to continue for another
50% to 100% of GDP to come back to historical values. This could occur via a
combination of continuing house value depreciation and stock market losses.
The second peak to the left coincides with the top of the dotcom bubble in 2000
that was followed by more than two years of strong bearish stock markets. The
two other arrows to the left, one in 1962 and the other one in 1987 also coincide
remarkably with two other bubbles previously documented in the literature: in 1962,
the tronic “new economy” bubble collapsed with a cumulative loss of about 35% in
three months; on 19 October 1987, the famous Black Monday crash occurred that
ended a strong spell of stock market appreciation over the previous few years.
Fig. 6 Share of wages and of private consumption in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for
the United States + European Union + Japan. Source of data and graphics: Michel Husson
(http://hussonet.free.fr/toxicap.xls)
The two figures 6 and 7 provide another vantage to appreciate fully the impact of
the past financial sphere expansion on the global U.S., European Union and Japan
economies. First, figure 6 compares the time evolution of private consumption in
the U.S., European Union and Japan expressed in percentage of the GDP to the total
wages. One can see that, until 1981, wages funded consumption. After 1984, the
gap between consumption and wages has been growing dramatically. This means
of course that consumption had to be funded by other sources of income than just
wages. Figure 7 suggests that this other source of income is nothing but the increas-
ing profits from investments, while the diminishing level of savings only partially
covered the increased consumption propensity. The gap widens between profit and
accumulation (gray zones) shown in figure 7, so as to compensate for the difference
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between the share of wages and the share of consumption (gray zones) shown in fig-
ure 6. In a nutshell, these two figures tell us that households in the U.S., European
Union and Japan have increased their overall level of consumption from about 64%
of GDP to almost 72% of GDP by extracting wealth from financial profits. Figures
for the U.S. alone confirm and amplify this conclusion. The big question is whether
the financial profits were translated into real productivity gains and, therefore, were
sustainable. It seems obvious today to everybody that financial innovations and their
profits, which do not provide productivity gains in the real economy, cannot consti-
tute a source of income on the long-term. This evidence was, however, lost as several
exuberant bubbles developed during the last 15 years.
Fig. 7 Rate of profit (left scale) and rate of accumulation or savings (right scale) for the United
States + European Union + Japan. The rate of accumulation is defined as the rate of growth rate
of the net volume of capital× rate of profit = profit/capital (base: 100 in 2000), Source of data and
graphics: Michel Husson (http://hussonet.free.fr/toxicap.xls)
The impact of financial profits on the wealth of households is well-illustrated by
figure 8. This graph demonstrates the very strong correlation between U.S. house-
hold wealth and the level of the stock market proxied by the Dow Jones Industrial
Average. This supports the concept that financial profits have played a crucial role in
the increase of household consumption discussed above. The component of wealth
due to real estate appreciation during the housing bubble may have actually played
an even bigger role, as it is well documented that the so-called wealth effect of house
value is about twice that of the financial markets [11].
As long as the incomes drawn from financial assets are re-invested, the fortunes
increase independently of any material link with the real sphere and the variation
can potentially increase without serious impediment. But, financial assets represent
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the right to a share of the surplus value that is produced. As long as this right is
not exercised, it remains virtual. But as soon as anyone exercises it, they discover
that it is subject to the law of value, which means one cannot distribute more real
wealth than is produced. The discrepancy between the exuberant inflation of the
financial sphere and the more moderate growth of the real economy is the crux of
the problem.
Fig. 8 The stock market level (left scale) and household wealth in the United States (right scale).
The Dow Jones Industrial Average is shown with base 100 in 1960. The net wealth of households
is given as a multiple of their current income. The five vertical grey zones outline 5 significant
events, which are from left to right: the crash of 1987, the Iraq war of 1991, the russian crisis of
1998, the crash and aftermath of the Internet bubble and the final subprime episode. Source of data
and graphics: Michel Husson (http://hussonet.free.fr/toxicap.xls)
The lack of recognition of the fundamental cause of the financial crisis as stem-
ming from the illusion of the “perpetual money machine” is symptomatic of the
spirit of the time. The corollary is that the losses are not just the downturn phase
of a business or financial cycle. They express a simple truth that is too painful to
accept for most, that previous gains were not real, but just artificially inflated val-
ues that have bubbled in the financial sphere, without anchor and justification in the
real economy. In the last decade, banks, insurance companies, Wall Street as well as
Main Street and many of us have lured ourselves into believing that we were richer.
But this wealth was just the result of a series of self-fulfilling bubbles. As explained
in more details below, in the USA and in Europe, we had the Internet bubble (1996-
2000), the real-estate bubble (2002-2006), the MBS bubble (2002-2007), an equity
bubble (2003-3007), and a commodity bubble (2004-2008), each bubble alleviating
the pain of the previous bubble or supporting and justifying the next bubble.
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The painful consequence of this brutal truth is that trying to support the level
of valuation based on these bubbles is like putting gas in the “perpetual money
machine.” Worse, it misuses scarce taxpayer resources, increasing long-term debts
and liabilities, which are already at dangerous levels in many countries.
A vivid example is provided by the market valuation of funds investing in brick-
and-mortar companies often observed to be much higher at times of bubbles than
the sum of the value of their components. Objective measures and indicators can
be developed to quantify the ratio of wealth resulting from finance compared with
the total economy. For instance, when it is measured that, on average, 40% of the
income of major US firms result from financial investments, this is clearly a sign
that the US economy is “building castles in the air” [47].
2 General framework for bubbles and crashes in finance
2.1 Introduction
Before reviewing the unfolding of the five bubbles over the 15 years that led to the
mother of all crises, we review our approach to the diagnostic of bubbles and the ex-
planation of crashes. A general review on models of financial bubbles encompassing
much of the literature can be found in Ref. [39].
Consider the seven price trajectories shown in figure 9. They are seven bubbles
that ended in very severe crashes. This figure illustrates the common future that
crashes occur after a spell of very strong value appreciation, following a similar
pattern. This suggests a common underlying mechanism.
According to the consecrated academic view that markets are efficient, only the
revelation of a dramatic piece of information can cause a crash, yet in reality even
the most thorough post-mortem analyses are typically inconclusive as to what this
piece of information might have been. This is certainly true for the seven cases
shown in figure 9 (see Ref. [59] for a detailed discussion).
Most approaches to explaining crashes search for possible mechanisms or ef-
fects that operate at very short time scales (hours, days, or weeks at most). Here, we
build on the radically different hypothesis [59] that the underlying cause of the crash
should be found in the preceding months and years, in the progressively increasing
build-up of market cooperativity, or effective interactions between investors, often
translated into accelerating ascent of the market price (the bubble). According to
this “critical” point of view, the specific manner by which prices collapsed is not the
most important problem: a crash occurs because the market has entered an unstable
phase and any small disturbance or process may reveal the existence of the insta-
bility. Think of a ruler held up vertically on your finger: this very unstable position
will lead eventually to its collapse, as a result of a small (or an absence of adequate)
motion of your hand or due to any tiny whiff of air. The collapse is fundamentally
due to the unstable position; the instantaneous cause of the collapse is secondary. In
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the same vein, the growth of the sensitivity and the growing instability of the market
close to such a critical point might explain why attempts to unravel the proximal
origin of the crash have been so diverse. Essentially, anything would work once the
system is ripe.
time
price
Fig. 9 Seven bubbles that ended in severe crashes. The bubble examples include stock market
indices, individual companies, currencies, and for different epochs in the twentieth century. Each
bubble has been rescaled vertically and translated to end at the time of the crash on the right of
the graph. The horizontal axis covers approximately 2.5 years of data. The legend for each of the
seven bubbles indicates the name of the asset supporting the bubble and the year when the crash
occurred.
What is the origin of the maturing instability? A follow-up hypothesis underlying
this paper is that, in some regimes, there are significant behavioral effects underly-
ing price formation leading to the concept of “bubble risks.” This idea is probably
best exemplified in the context of financial bubbles, such as the recent Internet ex-
ample culminating in 2000 or the real-estate bubble in the USA culminating in 2006.
Many studies have suggested that bubbles result from the over-optimistic expecta-
tion of future earnings (see, for instance, Ref. [56]), and many works have argued
contrarily for rational explanations (for example, Ref. [24]). History provides a sig-
nificant number of examples of bubbles driven by unrealistic expectations of future
earnings followed by crashes. The same basic ingredients have been documented to
occur repeatedly [59]. According to this view, fuelled by initially well-founded eco-
nomic fundamentals, investors develop a self-fulfilling enthusiasm by an imitative
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process or crowd behavior that leads to the building of castles in the air, to para-
phrase Malkiel [47]. Our previous research suggests that the ideal economic view,
that stock markets are both efficient and unpredictable, may be not fully correct. We
propose that, to understand stock markets, one needs to consider the impact of posi-
tive feedbacks via possible technical as well as behavioral mechanisms, such as im-
itation and herding, leading to self-organized cooperativity and the development of
possible endogenous instabilities. We thus propose to explore the consequences of
the concept that most of the crashes have fundamentally an endogenous, or internal,
origin and that exogenous, or external, shocks only serve as triggering factors. As a
consequence, the origin of crashes is probably much more subtle than often thought,
as it is constructed progressively by the market as a whole, as a self-organizing pro-
cess. In this sense, the true cause of a crash could be termed a systemic instability.
By studying many empirical historical examples, C. Kindleberger has identified
the universal scenario associated with the development of bubbles [41] as follows
(see also Ref. [59]):
displacement → credit creation → euphoria → critical financial distress → revulsion
(1)
The upswing usually starts with an opportunity (“displacement”) –new markets, new
technologies or some dramatic political change– and investors looking for good re-
turns. The scenario proceeds through the euphoria of rising prices, particularly of
assets, while an expansion of credit inflates the bubble. In the manic euphoric phase,
investors scramble to get out of money and into illiquid things such as stocks, com-
modities, real estate or tulip bulbs: a larger and larger group of people seeks to
become rich without a real understanding of the processes involved. Ultimately, the
markets stop rising and people who have borrowed heavily find themselves over-
stretched. This is distress, which generates unexpected failures, followed by revul-
sion or discredit. The final phase is a self-feeding panic, where the bubble bursts.
People of wealth and credit scramble to unload whatever they have bought at greater
and greater losses, and cash becomes king. The sudden fall, first in the price of the
primary object of speculation, then in most or all assets, is associated with a reverse
rush for liquidity. Bankruptcies increase. Liquidation speeds up, sometimes degen-
erating into panic. The value of collateral (credit and money) sharply contracts.
Then, debt deflation ends as productive assets move from financially weak owners
(often speculators or the original entrepreneurs) to financially strong owners (well
capitalized financiers). This provides the foundation for another cycle, assuming that
all the required factors (displacement, monetary expansion, appetite for speculation)
are present.
2.2 Conceptual framework
Let us now focus on the empirical question of the existence and detection of finan-
cial bubbles. But what are really bubbles? The term “bubble” is widely used but
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rarely clearly defined. Following (Case and Shiller, 2003) [13], the term “bubble”
refers to a situation in which excessive public expectations of future price increases
cause prices to be temporarily elevated. For instance, during a housing price bubble,
homebuyers think that a home that they would normally consider too expensive for
them is now an acceptable purchase because they will be compensated by significant
further price increases. They will not need to save as much as they otherwise might,
because they expect the increased value of their home to do the saving for them.
First-time homebuyers may also worry during a housing bubble that if they do not
buy now, they will not be able to afford a home later. Furthermore, the expectation
of large price increases may have a strong impact on demand if people think that
home prices are very unlikely to fall, and certainly not likely to fall for long, so that
there is little perceived risk associated with an investment in a home.
What is the origin of bubbles? In a nutshell, speculative bubbles are caused by
“precipitating factors” that change public opinion about markets or that have an im-
mediate impact on demand, and by “amplification mechanisms” that take the form
of price-to-price feedback, as stressed by Shiller (2000) [57]. Consider again the
example of a housing bubble. A number of fundamental factors can influence price
movements in housing markets. On the demand side, demographics, income growth,
employment growth, changes in financing mechanisms or interest rates, as well as
changes in location characteristics such as accessibility, schools, or crime, to name
a few, have been shown to have effects. On the supply side, attention has been paid
to construction costs, the age of the housing stock, and the industrial organization
of the housing market. The elasticity of supply has been shown to be a critical fac-
tor in the cyclical behavior of home prices. The cyclical process that we observed
in the 1980s in those cities experiencing boom-and-bust cycles was caused by the
general economic expansion, best proxied by employment gains, which drove de-
mand up. In the short run, those increases in demand encountered an inelastic sup-
ply of housing and developable land, inventories of for-sale properties shrank, and
vacancy declined. As a consequence, prices accelerated. This provided an amplifi-
cation mechanism as it led buyers to anticipate further gains, and the bubble was
born. Once prices overshoot or supply catches up, inventories begin to rise, time
on the market increases, vacancy rises, and price increases slow down, eventually
encountering downward stickiness. The predominant story about home prices is al-
ways the prices themselves [57, 59]; the feedback from initial price increases to
further price increases is a mechanism that amplifies the effects of the precipitating
factors. If prices are going up rapidly, there is much word-of-mouth communication,
a hallmark of a bubble. The word-of-mouth can spread optimistic stories and thus
help cause an overreaction to other stories, such as ones about employment. The
amplification can also work on the downside as well.
Another vivid example is the proposition offered close to the peak of the Inter-
net bubble that culminated in 2000, that better business models, the network effect,
first-to-scale advantages, and real options effect could account rationally for the
high prices of dot-com and other New Economy companies [50]. These interesting
views expounded in early 1999 were in synchrony with the bull market of 1999
and preceding years. They participated in the general optimistic view and added to
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the strength of the herd. Later, after the collapse of the bubble, these explanations
seemed less attractive. This did not escape U.S. Federal Reserve chairman Alan
Greenspan (1997), who said [27]: “Is it possible that there is something fundamen-
tally new about this current period that would warrant such complacency? Yes, it is
possible. Markets may have become more efficient, competition is more global, and
information technology has doubtless enhanced the stability of business operations.
But, regrettably, history is strewn with visions of such new eras that, in the end, have
proven to be a mirage. In short, history counsels caution.” In this vein, as mentioned
above, the buzzword “new economy” so much used in the late 1990s was also hot
in the 1960s during the “tronic boom” before a market crash, and during the bubble
of the late 1920s before the Oct. 1929 crash. In this latter case, the “new” economy
was referring to firms in the utility sector. It is remarkable how traders do not learn
the lessons of their predecessors!
Positive feedback occurs when an action leads to consequences which themselves
reinforce the action and so on, leading to virtuous or vicious circles. We propose the
hypotheses that (1) bubbles may be the result of positive feedbacks and (2) the dy-
namical signature of bubbles derives from the interplay between fundamental value
investment and more technical analysis. The former can be embodied in nonlin-
ear extensions of the standard financial Black-Scholes model of log-price variations
[61, 30, 14, 2].
The mechanisms for positive feedbacks in financial markets include (1) techni-
cal and rational mechanisms (option hedging, insurance portfolio strategies, trend
following investment strategies, asymmetric information on hedging strategies) and
(2) behavioral mechanisms (breakdown of “psychological Galilean invariance” [60],
imitation). We stress here particularly the second mechanism which, we believe,
dominates. First, it is actually “rational” to imitate when lacking sufficient time,
energy and information to make a decision based only on private information and
processing, that is, most of the time. Second, imitation has been documented in
psychology and in neuro-sciences as one of the most evolved cognitive processes,
requiring a developed cortex and sophisticated processing abilities. It seems that
imitation has evolved as an evolutionary advantageous trait, and may even have
promoted the development of our anomalously large brain (compared with other
mammals) [19]. Furthermore, we learn our basics and how to adapt mostly by im-
itation all through our life. Imitation is now understood as providing an efficient
mechanism of social learning. Experiments in developmental psychology suggest
that infants use imitation to get to know people, possibly applying a like-me test
(people who I can imitate and who imitate me). Imitation is found in highly social
living species which show, from a human observer point of view, intelligent behav-
ior and signs for the evolution of traditions and culture (humans and chimpanzees,
whales and dolphins, parrots). In non-natural agents as robots, imitation is a princi-
pal tool for easing the programming of complex tasks or endowing groups of robots
with the ability to share skills without the intervention of a programmer. Imitation
plays an important role in the more general context of interaction and collaboration
between software agents and human users.
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Humans are perhaps the most social mammals and they shape their environment
to their personal and social needs. This statement is based on a growing body of
research at the frontier between new disciplines called neuro-economics, evolution-
ary psychology, cognitive science, and behavioral finance [15, 10, 25]. This body of
evidence emphasizes the very human nature of humans with its biases and limita-
tions, opposed to the previously prevailing view of rational economic agents opti-
mizing their decisions based on unlimited access to information and to computation
resources.
Imitation, in obvious or subtle forms, is a pervasive activity of humans. In the
modern business, economic and financial worlds, the tendency for humans to imitate
leads in its strongest form to herding and to crowd effects. Imitation is a prevalent
form in marketing with the development of fashion and brands. We hypothesize that
financial bubbles are footprints of perhaps the most robust trait of humans and the
most visible imprint in our social affairs: imitation and herding (see Ref. [59], and
references therein).
2.3 Finite-time singular behavior of bubbles
This understanding of imitation and herding has led us to propose that one of the
hallmarks of a financial bubble is the faster-than-exponential growth of the price
of the asset under consideration. It is convenient to model this accelerated growth
by a power law with a so-called finite-time singularity [63]. This feature is nicely
illustrated by the price trajectory of the Hong-Kong Hang Seng index from 1970 to
2000, as shown in figure 10. The Hong Kong financial market is repeatedly rated
as providing one of the most pro-economic, pro-entrepreneurship and free market-
friendly environment in the world, and thus provides a textbook example of the
behavior of weakly regulated liquid and striving financial markets. In figure 10, the
logarithm of the price p(t) is plotted as a function of the time (in linear scale), so
that an upward trending straight line qualifies as exponential growth with a constant
growth rate equal to the slope of the line: the straight solid line corresponds indeed
to an approximately constant compounded growth rate of the Hang Seng index equal
to 13.8% per year. However, the most striking feature of figure 10 is not this average
behavior, but the obvious fact that the real market is never following and abiding to a
constant growth rate. One can observe a succession of price run-ups characterized by
growth rates ... growing themselves: this is reflected visually in figure 10 by transient
regimes characterized by strong upward curvature of the price trajectory. Such an
upward curvature in a linear-log plot is a first visual diagnostic of a faster than
exponential growth (which of course needs to be confirmed by rigorous statistical
testing). Such a price trajectory can be approximated by a characteristic transient
finite-time singular power law of the form
ln[p(t)] = A + B(tc− t)m , where B < 0, 0 < m < 1 , (2)
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and tc is the theoretical critical time corresponding to the end of the transient run-
up (end of the bubble). Such transient faster-than-exponential growth of p(t) is our
working definition of a bubble. It has the major advantage of avoiding the conun-
drum of distinguishing between exponentially growing fundamental price and expo-
nentially growing bubble price, which is a problem permeating most of the previous
statistical tests developed to identify bubbles (see Ref. [46] and references therein).
The conditions B < 0 and 0 < m < 1 ensure the super-exponential acceleration of
the price, together with the condition that the price remains finite even at tc. Stronger
singularities can appear for m < 0 [26].
Fig. 10 Trajectory of the Hong-Kong Hang Seng index from 1970 to 2000. The vertical log-scale
together with the linear time scale allows one to qualify an exponential growth with constant growth
rate as a straight line. This is indeed the long-term behavior of this market, as shown by the best
linear fit represented by the solid straight line, corresponding to an average constant growth rate of
13.8% per year. The 8 arrows point to 8 local maxima that were followed by a drop of the index
of more than 15% in less than three weeks (a possible definition of a crash). The 8 small panels
at the bottom show the upward curvature of the log-price trajectory preceding each of these local
maxima, which diagnose an unsustainable bubble regime, which culminates at the peak before
crashing. Reproduced from Ref. [62]
Such a mathematical expression (2) is obtained from models that capture the ef-
fect of a positive feedback mechanism. Let us illustrate it with the simplest example.
Starting with a standard proportional growth process d p/dt = rp (omitting for the
sake of pedagogy the stochastic component), where r is the growth rate, let us as-
sume that r is itself an increasing function of the price p, as a result of the positive
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feedback of the price on the future returns. For illustration, let us assume that r is
simply proportional to p (r = cp, where c is a constant), so that the proportional
growth equation become d p/dt = cp2. The solution of this equation is of the form
(2) where ln[p(t)] is replaced by p(t), with m = −1 and A = 0, corresponding to a
divergence of p(t) at tc. Many systems exhibit similar transient super-exponential
growth regimes, which are described mathematically by power law growth with an
ultimate finite-time singular behavior: planet formation in solar systems by run-
away accretion of planetesimals, Euler equation of inviscid fluids, general relativ-
ity coupled to a mass field leading to formation of black holes in finite time, Za-
kharov equation of beam-driven Langmuir turbulence in plasma, rupture and ma-
terial failures, nucleation of earthquakes modeled with the slip-and-velocity weak-
ening Ruina-Dieterich friction law, models of micro-organisms interacting through
chemotaxis aggregating to form fruiting bodies, Mullins-Sekerka surface instabil-
ity, jets from a singular surface, fluid drop snap-off, the Euler rotating disk, and so
on. Such mathematical equations can actually provide an accurate description of the
transient dynamics, not too close to the mathematical singularity where new mech-
anisms come into play. The singularity at tc mainly signals a change of regime. In
the present context, tc is the end of the bubble and the beginning of a new market
phase, possible a crash or a different regime.
Such an approach may be thought at first sight to be inadequate or too naive
to capture the intrinsic stochastic nature of financial prices, whose null hypothe-
sis is the geometric random walk model [47]. However, it is possible to generalize
this simple deterministic model to incorporate nonlinear positive feedback on the
stochastic Black-Scholes model, leading to the concept of stochastic finite-time sin-
gularities [61, 21, 22, 2]. Still much work needs to be done on this theoretical aspect.
Coming back to figure 10 , one can also notice that each burst of super-exponential
price growth is followed by a crash, here defined for the eight arrowed cases as a
correction of more than 15% in less than three weeks. These examples suggest that
the non-sustainable super-exponential price growths announced a “tipping point”
followed by a price disruption, i.e., a crash. The Hong-Kong Hang Seng index pro-
vides arguably one of the best textbook example of a free market in which bubbles
and crashes occur repeatedly: the average exponential growth of the index is punc-
tuated by a succession of bubbles and crashes, which seem to be the norm rather
than the exception.
More sophisticated models than (2) have been proposed to take into account the
interplay between technical trading and herding (positive feedback) versus funda-
mental valuation investments (negative mean-reverting feedback). Accounting for
the presence of inertia between information gathering and analysis on the one hand
and investment implementation on the other hand [30] or between trend followers
and value investing [20], the resulting price dynamics develop second-order oscilla-
tory terms and boom-bust cycles. Value investing does not necessarily cause prices
to track value. Trend following may cause short-term trend in prices, but also cause
longer-term oscillations.
The simplest model generalizing (2) and including these ingredients is the so-
called log-periodic power law (LPPL) model (Ref. [59] and references therein).
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Formally, some of the corresponding formulas can be obtained by considering that
the exponent m is a complex number with an imaginary part, where the imaginary
part expresses the existence of a preferred scaling ratio λ describing how the con-
tinuous scale invariance of the power law (2) is partially broken into a discrete scale
invariance [58]. The LPPL structure may also reflect the discrete hierarchical orga-
nization of networks of traders, from the individual to trading floors, to branches, to
banks, to currency blocks. More generally, it may reveal the ubiquitous hierarchical
organization of social networks recently reported [74] to be associated with the so-
cial brain hypothesis [19]. The simple implementation of the LPPL model that we
use in section 3 reads
ln[p(t)] = A+B(tc−t)m [1 +C cos(ω log(tc− t)+ φ)] , with 0 < m < 1 , and B < 0 .
(3)
The constant A is by construction equal to ln[p(tc)]. The two key parameters are the
exponent m, which characterizes the strength of the super-exponential acceleration
of the price on the approach to the critical time tc, and ω , which encodes the discrete
hierarchy of accelerated “impulse-retracting” market wave patterns associated with
the super-exponential acceleration. Specifically, the preferred scaling ratio encoding
the accelerated oscillations is given by λ ≡ e 2piω [58].
Examples of calibrations of financial bubbles with one implementation of the
LPPL model are the 8 super-exponential regimes discussed above in figure 10: the 8
small insets at the bottom of figure 10 show the LPPL calibration on the Hang Seng
index on the bubble phase that preceded each peak. Preliminary tests suggest that
the LPPL model provides a good starting point to detect bubbles and forecast their
most probable end [59]. Rational expectation models of bubbles a la Blanchard and
Watson implementing the LPPL model [32, 38, 37] have shown that the end of the
bubble is not necessarily accompanied by a crash, but it is indeed the time where
a crash is the most probable. But crashes can occur before (with smaller probabil-
ity) or not at all. That is, a bubble can land smoothly, approximately one-third of
the time, according to preliminary investigations [37]. Therefore, only probabilistic
forecasts can be developed. Probability forecasts are indeed valuable and commonly
used in daily life, such as in weather forecasts.
3 A 15 year history of the 2007-???? financial and economic
crisis
Using the general framework for bubbles and crashes outlined in section 2, we now
present the evidence on the five successive bubbles that developed over the last 15
years. We suggest that these five bubbles reveal the belief in the “perpetual money
machine” that characterized this epoch, as discussed in subsection 1.3.
Each bubble excess was thought and felt as “solved” by the following excess...
leading to a succession and combination of mutually reinforcing unsustainable fi-
nancial bubbles, preparing the ground for the instabilities that have been unravelling
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since 2007. The evidence presented in this section is useful to fully appreciate that
the present crisis and economic recession are to be understood as the “hangover”
and consolidation phase following this series of unsustainable excesses.
One should conclude that the extraordinary severity of this crisis is not going
to be solved by the same implicit or explicit “perpetual money machine” thinking,
that still characterize most of the proposed solutions. “The problems that we have
created cannot be solved at the level of thinking that created them.” said Albert
Einstein.
We start by presenting the analysis using the LPPL model (3) presented in sub-
section 2.3 of a global index obtained as follows. Starting from time series of emerg-
ing market equity indices, freight indices, soft commodities, base and precious met-
als, energy, and currencies, a principal component analysis (PCA) yields a set of
principal components that are thought to correspond to common factors acting on
these time series. The first principal component, which explains the largest fraction
of the covariance of these time series, is shown in figure 11, together with its fit with
the LPPL model (3). It is striking to observe the overall super-exponential behav-
ior, with a clear change of regime occurring mid-2008. The following subsections
allows us to decompose this overall process into bubble components.
Fig. 11 First component obtained from a principal component analysis performed on a data set
containing, emerging markets equity indices, freight indices, soft commodities, base and precious
metals, energy, and currencies. Source: Peter Cauwels, Fortis Bank – Global Markets
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3.1 FIRST PHASE: the ITC “new economy” bubble (1995-2000)
The nature of the ITC bubble is striking when comparing the price trajectories of two
indices constructed on the 500 companies forming the S&P500 index. The Internet
stock index is an equally weighted portfolio of 100 firms related to the Internet. The
non-Internet stock price index is an equally weighted portfolio made of the remain-
ing 400 “brick-and-mortar” companies. Figure 12 shows that the non-Internet stock
price index remained basically flat from 1998 to 2002, while exhibiting fluctuation
of roughly ±20% over this period. In contrast, the Internet stock index was mul-
tiplied by a factor 14 from 1998 to its peak in the first quarter of 2000, and then
shrunk with a great crash followed by a jumpy decay to below its initial value at the
end of 2002. The contrast between the behavior of these two indices over the same
4 years interval cannot be more shocking.
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Fig. 12 The Internet stock index and non-Internet stock index which are equally weighted as
explained in the text. Comparison of the index levels of the Internet index and the non-Internet
Stock index for the period 2 Jan. 1998 to 31 Dec. 2002. The two indexes are scaled to be 100 on 2
Jan. 1998. Courtesy of Taisei Kaizoji
The super-exponential nature of the Nasdaq composite index allows us to diag-
nose this period before 2000 as an unambiguous bubble as first reported by Johansen
and Sornette (2000) [34], according to the definition presented in subsection 2.3.
Figure 13 shows that the logarithm of the Nasdaq composite index indeed increased
with an overall upward curvature, signaling a super-exponential growth. The cali-
bration of the LPPL model (3) to the Nasdaq index is excellent (see Ref. [34] for
details and statistical tests).
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Fig. 13 Calibration of the LPPL model (3) to the Nasdaq Composite Indexfrom early 1997 to the
end of 1999. Reproduced from Ref. [34]
Fig. 14 Foreign capital inflow in the U.S. during the ITC bubble, illustrating the growth of the
euphoria phase in scenario (1) of subsection 2.1. The smoothed curve shows the fit of the net
capital inflow by an extension of the LPPL model (3) using higher-order log-periodic components
presented in Ref. [65]
As explained in the scenario (1) in subsection 2.1, a typical bubble goes through
a period of euphoria. This euphoria is characterized by an irresistible attraction, in
particular, to foreign investors, who cannot wait to be part of the celebration. This
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pattern is vividly observed in the case of the ITC bubble in figure 14, which shows
the flux of foreign capital inflow to the U.S. This inflow almost reached 400 billion
dollars per year at the peak. A significant part of this foreign capital was invested
in the U.S. market to profit from the return opportunities it provided until 2000.
The smoothed curve shows that the net capital inflow can also be well-fitted by the
LPPL model (3), yielding values for the exponent m and log-frequency ω , which
are consistent with those obtained for other bubbles [31].
3.2 SECOND PHASE: Slaving of the Fed monetary policy to the
stock market descent (2000-2003)
Fig. 15 Comparison of the Federal funds rate, the S&P 500 Index x(t), and the NASDAQ com-
posite z(t), from 1999 to mid-2003. To allow an illustrative visual comparison, the indices have
been translated and scaled as follows: x→ 5x−34 and z→ 10z−67. Reproduced from Zhou and
Sornette (2004) [71]
To fight the recession and the negative economic effects of a collapsing stock mar-
ket, the Fed engaged in a pro-active monetary policy (decrease of the Fed rate from
6.5% in 2000 to 1% in 2003 and 2004). Figure 15 shows this decrease of the Fed
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rate and compares it with the behavior of two U.S. market indices, the S&P500 and
the Nasdaq composite indices.
It is quite apparent that the Fed rate decreased in parallel to the U.S. stock mar-
ket. But did it lead it or lag behind it? According to common wisdom, the Federal
Reserve control of the leading rate indicator is supposed to influence the stock mar-
kets. A decrease of the Fed rate makes borrowing cheaper, giving more leverage to
firms to invest for the future. As a consequence, this should lead to anticipations of
larger future growth, and hence to larger present market values. Hence, logically,
the Fed rate drops should precede the market losses.
We check this prediction by showing in figure 16 the cross-correlation between
the returns of the S&P 500 index and the increments of the Federal funds rate as
a function of time lag. The remarkable result is that the Fed rate decreased with
a robustly determined lag of about 1− 2 months behind the on-going loss of the
S&P500. This reverse causality suggests that the Fed monetary policy has been
influenced significantly by (or “slaved” to) the vagaries of the stock market.
Fig. 16 “Causal Slaving” of the U.S. Treasury Bond Yield by the Stock Market Antibubble of
August 2000. The cross-correlation coefficient C(n) between the increments of the logarithm of
the S&P 500 Index and the increments of the Federal funds rate is shown as a function of time
lag n in days. The three curves corresponds to three different time steps used to calculate the
increments: weekly, monthly and quarterly. A positive lag n corresponds to having the Federal
funds rate posterior to the stock market. The arrow points to this lag. Reproduced from Zhou and
Sornette (2004) [71]
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 33
In 2003, Fed Chairman A. Greenspan argued that the Fed needed to set low in-
terest rates to prevent the U.S. economy from deteriorating so much that it would
follow a deflationary spiral, often referred to as a “liquidity trap” [43], a situation
in which conventional monetary policy loses all traction. Greenspan’s critics con-
tinue to debate about the influence of the exceptionally low Fed rates in 2002 and
2003 that are thought to have caused an extraordinary real estate bubble... that led
eventually to the 2007-???? crisis and recession.
Recently, economist Nick Rowe presented a piece of evidence [54] that is repro-
duced in figure 17, which illuminates this debate. The growth rate of the non-farm
business productivity is compared with the real Federal fund rate. It is apparent that
the Fed rate was pushed down at the time of a surge of productivity gains, not re-
ally a deteriorating economy. This combines with the previous evidence of figure
16 to support the view that the Federal Reserve has been too obnubilated by the
stock market signals. This is additional evidence that, even in the higher spheres of
finance, the stock market is taking over in shaping economic and strategic decisions.
We mentioned in the introduction of section 1 that the impact of financial markets
has been growing to basically dominate strategic decision at the firm level (see also
Ref. [9] for a dramatic example of this trend for the case Royal Ahold firm in the
Netherland). It seems that the monetary authorities are also infected by the same
stock market virus.
Fig. 17 Growth rate of the non-farm business productivity compared with the real Federal fund
rate. Reproduced from (Nick Rowe, 2009) [54]
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3.3 THIRD PHASE: Real-estate bubbles (2003-2006)
The pro-active monetary policy of the Federal Reserve described in the previ-
ous subsection, together with expansive Congressional real-estate initiatives, fueled
what can now be rated as one of the most extraordinary real-estate bubbles in his-
tory, with excesses on par with those that occurred during the famous real-estate
bubble in Japan in the late 1980s.
As Alan Greenspan himself documented in a scholarly paper researched during
his tenure as the Federal Research Chairman at that time [28], the years from 2003 to
2006 witnessed an extraordinary acceleration of the amount of wealth extracted by
Americans from their houses as shown in figure 18, which parallels the accelerated
house price appreciation shown in figure 19. The negative effects on consumption
and income due to the collapse of the first ITC bubble were happily replaced by an
enthusiasm and a sense of riches permeating the very structure of US society.
Fig. 18 Quantification of gross equity extraction by homeowners from their houses, showing the
accelerated growth that spilled over to the economy by fueling consumption. This figure shows
that, over the past decade and a half, equity extraction has been closely correlated with realized
capital gains on the sale of homes. Source: Greenspan and Kennedy (2005) [28]
In June 2005 (proof from the arXiv submissionhttp://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0506027),
Zhou and Sornette (2006) issued a diagnostic that about 2/5 of the states of the U.S.
were developing real estate bubbles. Zhou and Sornette (2006) predicted a peak for
most of the US real estate bubbles in mid-2006 [72]. The validity of this prediction
can be checked in figure 20.
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Fig. 19 (color online) Quarterly average HPI (house price index) in the 21 states and in the district
of Columbia (DC) that were found to exhibit a clear faster-than-exponential growth. For better
comparison, the 22 house price indices have been normalized to 100 at the second quarter of 1992.
The corresponding states symbols are given in the legend. Reproduced from Zhou and Sornette
(2006) [72]
Fig. 20 Year-over-year price changes for the Case-Shiller composite 10 and 20 indices (through
February 2008), and the Case-Shiller and OFHEO National price indices (through Q4 2007).
Adapted from http://calculatedrisk.blogspot.com . The pictures of the two books
are put here to emphasize the dominating sentiment in each phase (see Ref. [53] for a study of how
book sales reflect market bubbles)
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It should be noted that the real estate bubble has not been confined to the U.S.
but was active in many (but not all) countries. Exceptions include Germany, Japan,
Switzerland and The Netherlands. But the critical time of the peak of the bubble
has been different in different countries. For instance, it was mid-2004 for the U.K.
bubble [70] compared to mid-2006 for the U.S. bubble.
3.4 FOURTH PHASE: MBS, CDOs bubble (2004-2007)
Concomitantly with the real estate bubble, both the public and Wall Street were the
(sometimes unconscious) actors of a third bubble of subprime mortgage-backed se-
curities (MBS) and complex packages of associated financial derivatives, as already
described in subsection 1.2.2 and now shown in figures 21 and 22.
The growth of the MBS derivatives is exemplified in figures 21 and 22, which
respectively show (i) the total holding of mortgage related securities of different
financial institutions and (ii) the accelerated rate of new issuance of ABS until the
peak in March 2007, when the first signs of accelerating loan payment defaults
started to be felt on the MBS.
These two figures 21 and 22 clearly illustrate the MBS bubble and its bursting. In
addition, as pointed out by many astute observers, many of the MBS were “fragile”
as they were linked to two key unstable processes: the value of houses and the loan
rates. The “castles in the air” of bubbling house prices promoted a veritable eruption
of investments in MBS, these investments themselves pushing the demand for and
therefore the prices of houses – until the non-sustainability of these mutually as well
as self-reinforcing processes became apparent.
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Fig. 21 Total Holdings of US Home Mortgages by Type of Financial Institution. Source: Hyun
Song Shin, Princeton University
But to be clear; these financial instruments were great innovations which, in
normal times, would indeed have provided a win-win situation: more people have
access to loans, which become cheaper because banks can sell their risks to the
supposed bottomless reservoirs of investors worldwide with varying appetites for
different risk-adjusted returns.
The problem is that the MBS and collateral debt obligations (CDO) constituted
new types of derivatives. Their complexity together with the lack of historical expe-
rience may have provided the seed for unrealistic expectations of low risks and large
returns. Actually, this is part of a larger debate on the role of financial derivatives.
Many financial economists hold that derivatives serve a key role of making mar-
kets more complete, in the sense that more states of the world can be hedged by a
corresponding asset. As a consequence, financial markets become more efficient and
stable. Perhaps the most influential proponent of this view has been Alan Greenspan
himself. For more than a decade, Greenspan has fiercely objected whenever deriva-
tives have come under scrutiny in Congress or on Wall Street. “What we have found
over the years in the marketplace is that derivatives have been an extraordinarily
useful vehicle to transfer risk from those who shouldn’t be taking it to those who
are willing to and are capable of doing so,” Mr. Greenspan told the Senate Bank-
ing Committee in 2003. “We think it would be a mistake” to more deeply regulate
the contracts, he added. “Not only have individual financial institutions become less
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vulnerable to shocks from underlying risk factors, but also the financial system as a
whole has become more resilient.” – Alan Greenspan in 2004.
Fig. 22 New Issuance of Asset Backed Securities in Previous Three Months. Source: JP Morgan
Others disagree. The well-known financier G. Soros avoids using derivatives “be-
cause we dont really understand how they work.” Felix G. Rohatyn, the investment
banker whose action was instrumental during New York financial turmoils in the
1970s, described derivatives as potential “hydrogen bombs.” And, in the 2002 Berk-
shire Hathaway annual report, Warren E. Buffett observed that derivatives were “fi-
nancial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are
potentially lethal.”
These statements have recently been given theoretical support in new out-of-
equilibrium models of financial markets in which it is found that, paradoxically, on
the one hand the proliferation of financial instruments tends to make the market
more complete and efficient by providing more means for risk diversification, while
at the same time this proliferation of financial instruments erodes systemic stability
as it drives the market to a critical state characterized by large susceptibility, strong
fluctuations and, enhanced correlations among risks [8, 48, 49]
3.5 FIFTH PHASE: Stock market bubble (2004-2007)
The exuberant real-estate market and MBS bubbles spilled over to the stock market.
Figure 23 shows the S&P500 index (in logarithmic scale) as a function of time. A
clear upward overall upward curvature can be observed, which is characteristic of
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a super-exponential growth. The LPPL calibration confirms the existence of bubble
characteristics.
Fig. 23 S&P500 index (in logarithmic scale) shown as dots as a function of time. The dashed
vertical line shows the last observed time tlast used to perform the calibration of the LPPL model (3)
and the different smoothed curves correspond to different estimations obtained with distinct time
windows extending no later that tlast. The grey zone corresponds to the 80% confidence interval
for the predicted critical time tc of the end of the bubble. The inset shows the probability density
function of the predicted tc’s
3.6 SIXTH PHASE: Commodities and Oil bubbles (2006-2008)
As explained in subsection 3.3 and shown in figure 18, the growth of the real-estate
bubble, of the MBS bubble, and of the stock market bubble led to a huge extraction
of wealth or, in other words, the creation of a lot of wealth and of money. Both
money creation and wealth increase led to higher demand in all things that can be
consumed. In fact, the demand has been accelerating on basic commodities, which
developed clear bubble characteristics, as shown in figures 24 and 25.
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Fig. 24 Calibration of the LPPL model (3) to the time series of four commodities (corn, gold,
soybean and wheat) expressed in U.S. dollars
Oil prices exhibited a record rise, whose starting phase can be traced to 2003
according to our analysis [64], followed by a spectacular crash in 2008. The peak of
$145.29 per barrel was set on July 3, 2008 and a recent low of $40.81 was scraped on
December 5, 2008, a level not seen since 2004. On May 27, 2008, we addressed the
question of whether oil prices were exhibiting a bubble-like dynamics, which may
be symptomatic of speculative behavior, using our techniques based on statistical
physics and complexity theory [64]. Thorough analysis of our May 27, 2008 exper-
iment predicted a peak within a 80% confidence interval between May, 17 2008 and
July 14, 2008. The actual observed ‘crash’, where prices began a long downward
trend, began on the last day of this period.
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Fig. 25 Typical result of the calibration of the simple LPPL model to the oil price in US$ in
shrinking windows with starting dates tstart moving up towards the common last date tlast = May
27, 2008. Reproduced from Sornette et al. (2009) [64]
4 Thoughts on resolution of the crisis and its aftermath
4.1 Summary
We have presented evidence that the fundamental cause of the unfolding financial
and economic crisis lies in the accumulation of at least 5 bubbles whose interplay
and mutual reinforcement has led to an illusion of the “perpetual money machine”
allowing financial institutions to extract wealth from an unsustainable artificial pro-
cess.
The path from MBS problem to a global World recession and to potentially even
higher risks can be outlined as follows: drop in confidence → drop in demand →
major recession → interaction between a deep recession and a weakened financial
system → increased risk of trade wars→ collapse of global commodity prices and,
thus, revenues for low-income countries→ global instability.
In March 2007, the first visible signs of a worrisome increase in default rates ap-
peared, followed in the summer of 2007 by the startling realization by the financial
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community that the problem would be much more serious. In parallel with an accel-
eration of the default of homeowners and a deteriorating economic outlook, the sec-
ond part of 2007 and first part of 2008 saw a rapid increase, punctuated by dramatic
bankruptcies, in the estimated cumulative losses facing banks and other investment
institutions; from initial guesses in the range of tens of billions, to hundreds of bil-
lions, then to more than a trillion of U.S. dollars. The U.S. Federal Reserve and
U.S. Treasury stepped up their actions in proportion to the ever-increasing severity
of the uncovered failures, unaware of the enormity of the underlying imbalances,
or unwilling to take the measures that would address the full extent of the problem,
which only now (one hopes) has revealed its enormous systemic proportions. Let us
be blunt: Government has been blissfully unaware of the predictable effect of the
piling up these bubbles, as each one appeared to displace the problems induced by
the previous one. Monetary easing, the injection of liquidity, successive bailouts –
all address symptoms and ignore the sickness.
The sickness is the cumulative excess liability present in all the sectors of the US
economy: debts of U.S. households as a percentage of disposable income at around
130%, those of U.S. banks as a percentage of GDP currently around 110%, U.S.
Government debt at 65% of GDP, corporate debts at 90% GDP, state and local gov-
ernment debts at 20% GDP, unfunded liabilities of Medicare, Medicaid, and Social
Security in the range of 3-4 times GDP. Such levels of liabilities in the presence of
the bubbles have produced a highly reactive unstable situation in which sound eco-
nomic valuation becomes unreliable, further destabilizing the system. This sickness
has only been worsened by measures that disguise or deny it, like the misapplied
innovations of the financial sector, with their flawed incentive structures, and the de
facto support of an all-too willing population, eager to believe that wealth extrac-
tion could be a permanent phenomenon. On the sustainable long term, the growth
of wealth has to be equal to the actual productivity growth, which is about 2-3% in
real value on the long term in developed countries.
Acting on the “theory” that crises can be stopped if confidence is restored by
stopping the hemorrhage of MBS losses, and on the basis of the diagnostic that the
financial crisis was a “liquidity” problem, central banks and governments have ac-
tively intervened to combat the observed swing in risk taking shown by banks. One
set of measures amount basically to attempt stopping the devaluation of the MBS
assets held by financial institutions. Another set of measures tries to remove the so-
called “toxic” assets and park them in vehicles mainly owned by the government and
the Federal Reserve, until their values rebound, one hopes. Most measures attempt
to encourage more consumption and spending.
The evidence discussed above suggests strongly that this approach constitutes a
fundamental error because it misses the crucial point about the cause of the “losses.”
The losses are not just the downturn phase of a business cycle or the liquidity re-
sponse to an unlucky exogenous shock. They express a simple truth that is too
painful to accept for most, that previous gains were not real, but just artificially
inflated values that have bubbled in the financial sphere, without anchor and justi-
fication in the real economy. In the last decade, banks, insurance companies, Wall
Street as well as Main Street – we all have lured ourselves into believing that we
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 43
were richer. But this wealth was just the result of a series of self-fulfilling bubbles:
in the USA and in Europe, we had the Internet bubble (1996-2000), the real-estate
bubble (2002-2006), the MBS bubble (2002- 2007), an equity bubble (2003-3007),
and a commodity bubble (2004-2008), each bubble alleviating the pain of the previ-
ous bubble or supporting and justifying the next bubble. In a word, the overgrowth
of the “financial economy” compared with that of the real economy is reminiscent
of the fabled frog seized by a jealous desire to equal the ox in size [1].
The painful consequence of this brutal truth is that trying to support the level of
valuation based on these bubbles is tantamount to continue supporting the “perpetual
money machine”, which was the cause of the problem. Worse, it misuses scarce
taxpayer resources, increasing long-term debts and liabilities, which are already at
dangerous levels in many countries.
Encouraging over-spending to solve a crisis due to over-spending is an ill-advised
approach.
There are no silver bullets, but the following concepts should constitute part of a
basis for a pragmatic approach to the crisis.
4.2 Trust! Why it Has Been Lost and How to Regain It
The on-going credit crisis and panic shows that financial price and economic value
are based fundamentally on trust; not on fancy mathematical formulas, not on sub-
tle self-consistent efficient economic equilibrium; but on trust in the future, trust in
economic growth, trust in the ability of debtors to face their liabilities, trust in finan-
cial institutions to play their role as multipliers of economic growth, trust that your
money in a bank account can be redeemed at any time you choose. Usually, we take
these facts for granted, as an athlete takes for granted that her heart will continue
to pump blood and oxygen to her muscles. But what if she suffers a sudden heart
attack? What if normal people happen to doubt banks? Then, the implicit processes
of a working economy – all we take for granted – starts to dysfunction and spirals
into a global collapse.
Because of the failed governance, the crisis has accelerated, now in a burst of
such intensity that it has forced coordinated actions among all major governments.
While their present involvement may restore short-term confidence, much more is
needed to address the depth of the problem. At one level, the loss of trust between
financial institutions stems from the asymmetric information on their suddenly es-
calading counter-party risks, making even the most solid bank be perceived as a
potential candidate for default, leading to credit paralysis. This can be addressed by
financial measures and market forces. At a deeper level, people in the street have
lost confidence, by observing a succession of problems, timidly addressed by de-
cision makers proposing ad hoc solutions to extinguish the fire of the day (Bear
Stearns, Fannie, Freddie, AIG, Washington Mutual, Wachovia), with no significant
result and only more deterioration.
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Nothing can resist loss of trust, since trust is the very foundation of society and
economy. That people haven’t yet made a run on the banks is not, given today’s
insurance policies against the catastrophes of the past, sufficient indication to the
contrary. In fact, there has been already invisible run on the banks, as electronic and
wire transfers have been accelerating in favor of government-backed Treasury bills.
A significant additional impediment to the restoration of public trust is that the Fed,
Treasury and concerted government actions are perceived as supporting the notion
that “gains are private while losses are socialized.”
Present actions attempt to stabilize the financial sector by making governments,
therefore taxpayers, the lenders and buyers of last resort. But collectively people are
more intelligent than governments and decision makers think. They know that gov-
ernments, in particular in the West, have not saved (counter-cyclically a la Keynes)
during the good years2, and they thus wisely doubt their prudence during the bad
ones. They suspect that their governments will eventually extract the needed capital
from them. They suspect intuitively that the massive measures taken to support the
financial world will do little to help general economies of the US, Europe and the
rest of the world.
How to restore trust? This is a long, tedious and fragile process. We suggest
that governing bodies must for once play to the intelligence of the crowd. What
needs to be done is to explain truthfully (is this possible?) the true cause of the
problems: the more than one decade of excesses and the successive and inter-related
bubbles, the fact that the liabilities are enormous and that the budget has in the end
to be balanced, that accelerating borrowing on the future cannot be a sustainable
strategy. As humans, we are more inspired to trust when failures are acknowledged
than when blame is shifted to someone else. This is the core reason why going to
the fundamental source of the problems may be part of the solution in restoring
confidence in the existence of a solution at minimal cost.
Second, the issue of fairness is essential for restoring confidence and support.
There is an absolute need to rebuild that confidence, and this applies also to the
regulators. This requires new strong regulations to deal with conflicts of interest,
moral hazard, and to enforce the basic idea of well-functioning markets in which in-
vestors who took risks to earn profits must also bear the losses. For instance, to fight
the rampant moral hazard that fueled the bubbles, share-holders should be given
“clawback” permission, that is, the legal right to recover senior executive bonus
and incentive pay, that proved to be ill-founded. In addition, many of the advisors
and actors of the present drama have vested interest and strong conflict of interests.
This particularly the case in the U.S, for the Fed, the Treasury and the major banks
acting on behalf or with the approval of the Treasury. An independent (elected?)
2 In this respect, note the information from Reuters, Santiago, March 27, 2009, reporting that
Chile’s President Michelle Bachelet unwittingly embarrassed British Prime Minister Gordon
Brown when she said Chile had put aside money during good economic times to help it through the
downturn. “I would say that because of our decision during ... the good times in copper prices, we
decided to save some of the money for the bad times and I would say that policy today is producing
good results.”
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body would be one way to address this problem, ensuring separation of interest and
power.
4.3 Short-term: melting the cash flow freeze
The most immediate issue is to address the cash flow freeze imposed by banks, with
their newfound overly restrictive lending rules, on companies and households. This
cash flow problem bears the seed of a spiraling recession of catastrophic amplitude,
which has no fundamental reason to develop, except as an unwanted consequence
of pro-cyclical feedbacks aggravating a necessary correction that should only be
confined to the financial sphere. Here, the central banks and governments should
show creativity in ensuring that small and medium size companies have access to
monthly liquidity, to allow them to continue producing and hiring. This is the issue
that has been by far the most under-estimated and which requires a fast and vigorous
solution.
In addition to providing lending facilities to banks conditional on serving their
natural multiplier role in the economy, special governmental structures could be
created with a finite lifetime, with the mandate to provide liquidity to the real econ-
omy, bypassing the reluctant banks. Note that this procedure should not necessarily
be used to bailout some large badly managed companies in some industry sectors,
when in obvious need of restructuring. Crises are often opportunities for restructur-
ing, which provide increased benefits in the future as some cost in the present.
B. Lietaer has proposed a different approach based on the use of a complemen-
tary currency to help make the network of financial interactions between companies
more robust [45], in analogy with ecological networks which derive their resilience
from the multiple network levels they are built on. As a first candidate for this com-
plementary currency could be a professionally run business-to-business system of
payments on the model of the WIR system3, which has been successfully opera-
tional for 75 years in Switzerland, involving a quarter of all the businesses in that
country. This system has been credited by J. Stodder as a significant counter-cyclical
stabilizing factor that may contribute to the proverbial stability of the Swiss econ-
omy [66].
3 The Swiss Economic Circle (Wirtschaftsring-Genossenschaft or WIR) is an independent com-
plementary currency system in Switzerland that serves small and medium-sized businesses. It was
founded in 1934 by businessmen Werner Zimmermann and Paul Enz as a result of currency short-
ages after the stock market crash of 1929 and the great recession. “Its purpose is to encourage par-
ticipating members to put their buying power at each other’s disposal and keep it circulating within
their ranks, thereby providing members with additional sales volume.” Cited from Wikipedia
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4.4 Long-term: growth based on returning to fundamentals and
novel opportunities
Long-term economic stimulation programs are needed on a large scale, probably
a few percent of GDP, with pragmatic adaptive tuning as the crisis unfolds. They
should focus on the fundamentals of wealth growth: infrastructure, education and
entrepreneurship, with the goal of promoting productivity growth and the creation
of new real economic sources of wealth. Many studies demonstrate for instance a
direct impact of machinery equipment on economic growth.
Similarly, by many metrics, the quality of education in the USA and to a lesser
degree in Europe has been degrading in the recent decades. This crisis is an oppor-
tunity to go back to the fundamentals of the roots of long-term sustainable wealth
creation. These stimulation programs offer an opportunity to adapt and develop new
infrastructure which are more energy and pollution efficient, thus promoting the de-
velopment of new industry sectors such as wind energy, electricity storage, nuclear
waste processing and recycling and so on.
Given growing evidence that mankind is facing global challenges for its sus-
tainability on the finite Earth, the financial-rooted crisis offers a chance for using its
associated political capital to make bold choices to steer an environmentally friendly
economic development. Governments are best in their role of risk takers investing in
long-term R&D projects that provide the support for innovations that industry can
build upon to provide increased prosperity in the future.
4.5 The financial sphere, bubbles and inflation
One has to accept the need for an abrupt deflation of the financial sphere. And for the
future, mechanisms should be designed to control the over-growth of the financial
economy to ensure better stability. When functioning properly, the financial world
provides many services such as efficient access to funding for firms, governments
and private people. Furthermore, it works as an effective storage of value, which
should reflect the “real economy.” But the extraordinary growth of the component
of wealth associated with the financial world has been artificial and based on multi-
pliers amplifying the virtual fragile components of wealth. Objective measures and
indicators can be developed to quantify the ratio of wealth resulting from finance
compared with the total economy. For instance, when it is assessed that, on average,
about 40% of the income of major US firms result from financial investments, this
is clearly a sign that the US economy is “building castles in the air.” In the academic
literature, this is related to the concept of “financialization”4, according to which
profit making occurs increasingly through financial channels, and shareholder value
tends to dominate corporate governance.
4 see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financialization
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The way we think of inflation also needs to be re-evaluated. For instance, a house
price appreciation does not just mean that you are more wealthy as a homeowner;
it also implies that you need more dollars or euros to buy one unit of habitation
compared to units of food, vacation or university tuition. From this vantage, it is part
of inflation. While already considered in present measure of the so-called consumer
price index (CPI), its weight and impact need to be re-evaluated. We propose that
real-estate and equity indices should be incorporated as constituents of inflation
metrics, of course with adequate consideration for the hedonic gains5. A financial
ratio index could be created to follow a broader definition of inflation useful for
central bank monitoring, which includes the growth of total fixed assets, working
capital, excess supply of money and so on.
With such tools, monetary policy with inflation targets will provide natural par-
tial control over some of the asset bubbles at the origin of the present financial crisis.
Guidelines could be drawn to flag warning signals to central banks and governments
when the ratio of the financial wealth compared with the real economy value grows
above a bracket that could be defined from a consensus among economists and ac-
tions could be taken to moderate the growth of this ratio. These indicators should be
the key targets of modern central banks.
Central banks and governments should step in to support financial institutions,
but only under fair conditions that ensure that stockholders and lower priority debt
holders support the consequences of the losses, avoiding the privatization of gains
and socialization of losses. Different technical mechanisms have been proposed by
financial economists, which serve this goal, safeguarding the interest of the taxpay-
ers on the long term.
As a final point on the issue of the size of the financial sphere, the first author is
a happy professor teaching financial economics to a growing corpus of students in a
World-renowned technical university. We are however worried by the growing flood
of civil, mechanical, electrical and other engineers choosing to become transfuges
and work in finance: Is this another bubble in the making? Finance will not solve
the many problems mentioned above. Creativity and entrepreneurship occurring in
the real economy and the real world need to be better rewarded.
4.6 Recipes for a more robust and sustainable World
The present crisis is illustrating the accelerating fragility of society. We believe that
this is just a foreshock of much more serious jolts to come on times scales of just
one or two decades. In this respect, we refer to Johansen and Sornette (2001) [35]
and to to Chapter 10 of Sornette (2003) [59], in which the analysis of Earth’s hu-
man population, its economic output and global stock market capitalization suggest
a transition to a completely new regime circa 2050, over a time scale of several
decades around that date.
5 Governments use so-called hedonic regression in computing their CPI to take quality changes
into account.
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However, now is an opportunity to build a more resilient World. Recipes are
known. They involve the need for variety, redundancy, compartments, sparseness of
networks and consequences of the unavoidable delays and synchronization of ac-
tions. This “robustness” approach is well exemplified by a conservative investment
approach based on (i) understanding the vehicles and firms in which one invests
(which contrasts with the opaqueness of the MBS investments) and (ii) keeping
capital even under extraordinarily adverse conditions. This strongly contrasts with
standard financial practices based on estimated likelihoods for meeting obligations
and short-term gains. This requires fundamentally new design in infrastructures and
in regulations. The task is complex, but realizing and formulating it is a major step
that should be followed by a vigorous program at the international level, based on
multidisciplinary task forces that are well-funded and empowered with authority.
Leading countries should start at their domestic level to nucleate the process inter-
nationally.
Beyond the immediate concerns, we need to keep in mind the big picture, that
this time is a unique opportunity for change and improvement. The present crisis
should be exploited to start developing a genuine culture of risks, which should
be obligatory training for managers in governments, in regularity bodies, and in
financial institutions. One little discussed reason for the present crisis was indeed
the lack of adequate education of top managers on risks in all its dimensions and
implications. This is also the time that a culture of risk should start permeating the
public at large. In the 21st century, “linear” and “equilibrium” thinking should be
replaced by a growing appreciation of the inter-connectivity and feedbacks of the
complex systems we deal with, which creates shocks – with opportunities.
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